4 Jan. 46

Army Group H, which had retreated beyond the Rhine. The first three paragraphs of his affidavit are substantially identical with the first three paragraphs of Von Blomberg's; and since they are available in all languages, for expedition I will start reading with Paragraph 4, where the affidavit is on a different subject:

"After the annexation of Czechoslovakia we hoped that the Polish question would be settled in a peaceful fashion through diplomatic means, since we believed that this time France and England would come to the assistance of their ally. As a matter of fact, we felt that if political negotiations came to nothing the Polish question would unavoidably lead to war, that is, not only with Poland herself but also with the Western Powers.

"When in the middle of June I received an order from the OKH to prepare myself for an attack on Poland, I knew that this war came even closer to the realm of possibility. This conclusion was only strengthened by the Führer's speech on 22 August 1939 at the Obersalzberg when it clearly seemed to be an actuality. Between the middle of June 1939 and 1 September 1939 the members of my staff who were engaged in preparations participated in various discussions which went on between the OKH and the army group. During these discussions such matters of a tactical, strategical, and general nature were discussed as had to do with my future position as Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Army during the planned Polish campaign.

"During the Polish campaign, particularly during the Kutno operations, I was repeatedly in communication with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army; and he, as well as the Führer visited my headquarters. In fact, it was common practice for commanders-in-chief of army groups and of armies to be asked from time to time for estimates of the situation and for their recommendations by telephone, teletype, or wireless, as well as by personal calls. These front commanders-in-chief thus actually became advisers to the OKH in their own field, so that the positions shown in the attached chart embrace that group which was the actual advisory council of the High Command of the German Armed Forces."
The Tribunal will note that the latter part of this affidavit, like those of Halder and Brauchitsch, vouches for the accuracy. of the structure and organization of the General Staff and High Command group as described by the Prosecution. The Tribunal will also note that the Von Blomberg affidavit and the first part of the Blaskowitz affidavit make it clear beyond question that the military leaders of Germany knew of, approved, supported, and executed plans for the