10 Dec. 45

found in the OKW files at Flensburg. It is our Document Number 384-PS, and was referred to by the United States Chief of Counsel in his opening address. I shall not burden the Tribunal and the record by introducing two identical copies of the same order.

Basic Order Number 24 was the authoritative Nazi policy on collaboration with Japan. I shall, therefore, propose to read it in its entirety, some two pages of English translation:

"The Führer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:

"1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan, as soon as possible, to take active measures in the Far East" — The underscoring is in the original document — " Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific. The sooner she intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of her adversaries. The Barbarossa operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this."
Then there is a marginal note, "Slightly exaggerated."

THE PRESIDENT: Do you have any idea when that marginal notation was put in?

MR. ALDERMAN: I assume that was written by the recipient of this copy of the order.


MR. ALDERMAN: By the recipient of this particular copy of the order, which was the naval war staff.

"2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available. For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience, and for assistance in military economics and in technical. matters. Reciprocity is desirable, but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war. In special cases the Führer reserves the decisions for himself.

"3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Naval High Command. This will be subject to the following guiding principles: