7 Dec. 45

"As a result of these steps Quisling was granted a personal audience with the Führer on the 16th of December, and once more on the 18th of December. In the course of this audience the Führer emphasized repeatedly that he personally would prefer a completely neutral attitude of Norway as well as of the whole of Scandinavia. He did not intend to enlarge the theater of war and to draw still other nations into the conflict."
As I have said in opening the presentation of this part of the case, here was an instance where pressure had to be brought to bear on Hitler to induce him to take part in these operations.

The report continues

"Should the enemy attempt" — there is a mis-translation here — "to extend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further throttling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would be compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking. In order to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity, the Führer promised Quisling financial support of this movement, which is based on Greater Germanic ideology. Military exploitation of the question now raised was assigned to the special military staff which transmitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses were to be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs" — that is to say, by Ribbentrop's organization — "the Minister for Foreign Affairs" — that is to say, Ribbentrop — "being kept continuously informed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau" — which, of course, was Rosenberg's organization.

Chief of Section Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling. In the course of further developments he wits assigned to the Naval Attaché in Oslo . . . . Orders were given that the whole matter be handled with strictest secrecy."
Here again the Court will note the close link between the Nazi politicians and the Nazi service chiefs. The information that is available to the Prosecution as to the events of January 1940 is not full, but the Court will see that the agitation of the Defendants Raeder and Rosenberg did bear fruit, and I now invite the Court to consider a letter of Keitel's, Document C-63, which for the purposes of the record will be Exhibit GB47. The Court will observe that that is an order — a memorandum — signed by the Defendant Keitel dated the 27th of January 1940. It is marked "Most secret, five copies; reference, Study 'N' ; " — which was another code name for the Weserübung preparations — access only through an officer." It is indicated that "C-in-C of the