5 Dec. 45

and it shows that on the same date the Hossbach meeting was taking place, a communiqué was being issued as a result of the Polish Ambassador's audience with Hitler, in which it was said in the course of the conversation that it was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with difficulties because of the Danzig question. That Document is TC-73. I put it in as GB-27. On the 2d of January . . . .

THE PRESIDENT:. That hasn't been read before, has it?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It was read by the Attorney General in his opening.

THE PRESIDENT: In his opening? Very well.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: On the 2d of January 1938 some unknown person wrote a memorandum for the Führer This document was one of the German Foreign Office documents of which a microfilm was captured by Allied troops when they came into Germany. It is headed, "Very confidential — personal only," and is called, "Deductions on the Report, German Embassy, London, regarding the Future Form of Anglo-German Relations":

"With the realization that Germany will not tie herself to a status quo in Central Europe, and that sooner or later a military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an agreement will slowly disappear among Germanophile British politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises: Will Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate camps and will they march once more against each other one day? To answer this question, one must realize the following:

"A change of the status quo in the East in the German sense can only be carried out by-force. As long as France knows that England, which so to speak, has taken on a guarantee to aid France against Germany, is on her side, France's fighting for her eastern allies is probable, in any case, always possible, and thus with it war between Germany and England. This applies then even if England does not want war. England, believing she must defend her borders on the Rhine, would be dragged in automatically by France. In other words, peace or war between England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows, therefore, that war between Germany and England on account of France can be prevented only if France knows from the start that England's forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common victory. Such a situation might force England, and thereby France, to accept a