4 Dec. 45

homeland as a base for the carrying on of the war against Germany . . . . Preparations for the entire operation must be completed by mid-August."
But the first essential condition for that plan was, I quote:

" . . . the British Air Force must morally and actually be so far overcome that it does not any longer show any considerable aggressive force against the German attack."
The Defendant Göring and his Air Force, no doubt, made the most strenuous efforts to realize that condition but, in one of the most splendid pages of our history, it was decisively defeated. And although the bombardment of England's towns and villages was continued throughout that dark winter of 1940-41, the enemy decided in the end that England was not to be subjugated by these means, and, accordingly, Germany turned back to the East, the first major aim unachieved.

On the 22d of June 1941 German Armed Forces invaded. Russia, without warning, without declaration of war. It was, of course, a breach of the usual series of treaties; they meant no more in this case than they had meant in the other cases. It was a violation of the Pact of Paris; it was a flagrant contradiction of the Treaty of Non-Aggression which Germany and Russia had signed on the 23rd of August a year before.

Hitler himself said, in referring to that agreement, that "agreements were only to be kept as long as they served a purpose."

The Defendant Ribbentrop was more explicit. In an interview with the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on the 23rd of February 1941, he made it clear that the object of the agreement had merely been, so far as Germany was concerned, to avoid a two-front war.

In contrast to what Hitler and Ribbentrop and the rest of them were planning within the secret councils of Germany, we know what they were saying to the rest of the world.

On the 19th of July, Hitler spoke in the Reichstag:

"In these circumstances" — he said — "I considered it proper to negotiate as a first priority a sober definition of interest with Russia. It would be made clear once and for all what Germany believes she must regard as her sphere of interest to safeguard her future and, on the other hand, what Russia considers important for her existence. From this clear delineation of the sphere of interest there followed the new regulation of Russian-German relations. Any hope that now, at the end of the term of the agreement, a new Russo-German tension could arise is childish. Germany has taken no step which would lead her outside her sphere of interest, nor has Russia. But England's hope to achieve an amelioration of her own