4 Dec. 45

of the Versailles and Locarno Treaties, the feverish rearmament of Germany, the reintroduction of conscription, the reoccupation and remilitarization of the Rhineland, and all those other necessary preparatory measures for future aggression which my American colleagues have already so admirably put before the Tribunal.

During that period — the preparatory period — Germany was lulling Poland into a false sense of security. Not only Hitler, but the Defendant Göring and the Defendant Ribbentrop made statements approbating the non-aggression pact. In 1935 Göring was saying that, "The pact was not planned for a period of 10 years but forever; there need not be the slightest fear that it would not be continued." Even though Germany was steadily building up the greatest war machine that Europe had ever known, and although, by January 1937, the German military position was so strong and so secure that, in spite of the treaty breaches which it involved Hitler could openly refer to his strong Army, he took pains, at the same time, to say— and again I quote — that:

"By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely recall the agreement with Poland which has worked out to the advantage of both sides."
And so it went on: abroad, protestations of pacific intentions; at home, "guns before butter."

In 1937 this preparatory period drew to a close and Nazi policy moved from general preparation for future aggression to specific planning for the attainment of certain specific aggressive aims. And there are two documents in particular which mark that change. The first of these was called "Directive for Unified Preparation for War", issued in June 1937 — June 29, 1937 — by the Reich Minister for War, who was then Von Blomberg, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. That document is important, not only for its military directions, but for the appreciation it contained of the European situation and for the revelation of the Nazi attitude towards it.

"The general political position" — Von Blomberg stated, and I am quoting from the document — "justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Grounds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of states, and of Russia in particular."
It is true, he added, "The intention of unleashing a European war is held just as little by Germany." And it may be that that phrase was carefully chosen because, as the documents will show,