3 Dec. 45

to be worked out in conjunction with OKW and submitted to me for approval.

"5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces.

"a. Army. The basic principle of the surprise attack against Czechoslovakia must not be endangered nor the initiative of the Air Force be wasted by the inevitable time required for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail. Therefore it is first of all essential to the Army that as many assault columns as possible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the Air Force. These assault columns — the composition of each, according to their tasks at that time — must be formed with troops which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czechoslovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction, to achieve a break-through, or to break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, co-operation with the Sudeten-German frontier population, with deserters from the Czechoslovakian Army, with parachutists or airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of frustrating the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czechoslovakian army from escaping . . ."
THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read all this detail?

MR. ALDERMAN: I was just worried about not getting it into the transcript. THE PRESIDENT: It seems to me that this is all detail, that before you pass from the document you ought to read the document on Page 15, which introduces it and which gives the date of it.

MR. ALDERMAN: I think so. It is a letter dated:

"Berlin, 30 May 1938; copy of the fourth copy; Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; most secret; access only through officer; written by an officer. Signed Keitel; distributed to C-in-C Army, C-in-C Navy, C-in-C Air Force.

"By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Part 2, Section II, of the directive on the unified preparations for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937, (Ob. d. W)" — with some symbols, including "Chefsache" (top secret) — "(two-front war with main effort on the Southeast-strategic concentration Green) is to be replaced by the attached version. Its execution must be assured as from 1 October 1938 at the latest. Alterations in other parts of the directives must be expected during the next week.