29 Nov. 45

I now offer in evidence our Document C-102 as Exhibit USA-74, a captured German document, top secret, the directive of the Supreme High Command of the Armed Forces, 11 March 1938. This directive by Hitler, initialed by the Defendants Jodl and Keitel, stated Hitler's mixed political and military intentions. I quote Paragraphs 1, 4, and 5 of the directive. First the caption, "The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces" with some initials; "referring to Operation Otto; 30 copies." This is the 11th copy; top secret:

"1. If other measures prove unsuccessful I intend to invade Austria with armed forces to establish constitutional conditions and to prevent further outrages against the pro-German population.

"4. The forces of the Army and Air Force detailed for this operation must be ready for invasion and/or ready for action on 12 March 1938 at the latest from 1200 hours. I reserve the right to give permission for crossing and flying over the frontier and to decide the actual moment for invasion.

"5. The behavior of the troops must give the impression that we do not want to wage war against our Austrian brother; it is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence, but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms."

I also offer in evidence captured German Document C-103 as Exhibit USA-75. This was an implementing directive issued by the Defendant Jodl, and it provided as follows:

"Top secret; 11 March 1938; 40 copies, sixth copy.

"Special Instruction Number 1 to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Number 427/38,"--with some symbols.--

"Directive for policy toward Czechoslovakian and Italian troops or militia units on Austrian soil.

"1. If Czechoslovakian troops or militia units are encountered in Austria they are to be regarded as hostile.

"2. The Italians are everywhere to be treated as friends, especially as Mussolini has declared himself disinterested in the solution of the Austrian question. The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl."

Next, the actual events of 11 March 1938 in Austria are available to us in two separate accounts. Although these accounts differ in some minor details, such as precise words used and precise times when they were used, they afford each other almost complete corroboration. We think it appropriate for this Tribunal to have before