29 Nov. 45

Ambassador in Paris, to the American Secretary of State on 23 November 1937.

Now, again, if the Tribunal please, we are embarrassed because that document is not in the document book before the members of the Tribunal. It has been furnished in German translation to the Defense Counsel.

If the Tribunal will permit, I will read from the original exhibit. On top is a letter from Ambassador Bullitt to the Secretary of State, November 23, 1937, stating that he visited Warsaw, stopped in Berlin en route, where he had conversations with Schacht and Göring, among others.

On the conversation with Schacht, I read from Page 2 of the report:

"Schacht said that in his opinion, the best way to begin to deal with Hitler was not through political discussion but through economic discussion. Hitler was not in the least interested in economic matters. He regarded money as filth. It was therefore possible to enter into negotiations with him ' in the economic domain without arousing his emotional antipathy, and it might be possible through the conversations thus begun to lead him into arrangements in the political and military field, in which he was intensely interested. Hitler was determined to have Austria eventually attached to Germany, and to obtain at least autonomy for the Germans of Bohemia. At the present moment he was not vitally concerned about the Polish Corridor and in his"--that is Schacht's-- "opinion, it might be possible to maintain the Corridor, provided Danzig were permitted to join East Prussia, and provided some sort of a bridge could be built across the Corridor, uniting Danzig and East Prussia with Germany."

And for the Defendant Göring's statements to Ambassador Bullitt, I read from the second memorandum, "Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Bullitt and General Hermann Göring," on Page 2 of that document, following a part of a sentence which is underlined, just below the middle of the page:

"The sole source of friction between Germany and France was the refusal of France to permit Germany to achieve: certain vital national necessities.

"If France, instead of accepting collaboration with Germany, should continue to follow a policy of building up alliances in Eastern Europe to prevent Germany from the achievement of her legitimate aims, it was obvious that there would be conflict between France and Germany.