28 Nov. 45

which influenced Austria's willingness to make concessions to Germany and to come to terms.

I quote again from the Messersmith affidavit, Page 11 of the English text. That is Document 1760-PS.

"Developments in the fall of 1935 and the spring of 1936 gave Germany an opportunity to take more positive steps in the direction of the nazification of Austria. Italy, which had given Austria assurance of support of the most definite character against external German aggression and on one occasion, by mobilizing her forces, had undoubtedly stopped German aggressive action which had been planned against Austria, embarked on her Abyssinian adventure. This and the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 completely upset the balance in Europe. It is quite obvious that after Italy had launched her Abyssinian adventure, she was no longer in any position to counter German aggressive moves against Austria."

This weakening of Austria helped to pave the way for the pact of July 11, 1936. On July 11, 1936 the Governments of Austria and Germany concluded an accord. That will be offered in evidence also by the British Delegation.

I merely ask at this point, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of the fact that such an accord was entered into. The formal part of the agreement of July 11, 1936 will also be proved by our British colleagues For convenient reference, it will be found in the Document which the British will offer, TC-22, and the substance of it is also contained on Pages 11 and 12 of Mr. Messersmith's affidavit, 1760-PS.

Upon the basis of this fight alone, the agreement looked like a great triumph for Austria. It contains a confusing provision to the effect that Austria in her policy, especially with regard to Germany, would regard herself as a German state, but the other two provisions clearly state that Germany recognizes the full sovereignty of Austria and regards the inner political order of Austria, including the question of Austria and National Socialism, as an internal concern of Austria upon which Germany will exercise neither direct nor indirect influence. But there was much more substance to the day's events than appears in the text of the accord. I refer to Mr. Messersmith's summary as set forth on Page 12 of his affidavit, 1760-PS, as follows:

"Even more important than the terms of the agreement published in the official communiqué, was the contemporaneous informal understanding, the most important provisions of which were that Austria would: