26 Nov. 45

of June 1941 and the case on collaboration between Italy and Japan and Germany and the resulting attack on the United States on the 7th of December 1941.

As to the case on aggression against the Soviet Union, I shall at this point present two documents. The first of these two documents establishes the premeditation and deliberation which preceded the attack. Just as, in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia, the Nazis had a code name for the secret operation "Case Green", so in the case of aggression against the Soviet Union, they had a code name "Case Barbarossa."

THE PRESIDENT: How do you spell that?

MR. ALDERMAN: B-a-r-b-a-r-o-s-s-a, after Barbarossa of Kaiser Friederich. From the files of the OKW at Flensburg we have a secret directive, Number 21, issued from the Führer's headquarters on 18 December 1940, relating to Case Barbarossa. This directive is more than six months in advance of the attack. Other evidence will show that the planning occurred even earlier. The document is signed by Hitler and is initialled by the Defendant Jodl and the Defendant Keitel. This secret order was issued in nine copies. The captured document is the fourth of these nine copies. It is Document Number 446-PS in our numbered series.

I offer it in evidence as Exhibit USA-31.

If the Tribunal please, I think it will be sufficient for me to read the first page of that directive, the first page of the English translation. The paging may differ in the German original.

It is headed "The Führer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces," with a number of initials, the meaning of which I don't know, except OKW. It seems to be indicated to go to GK chiefs, which I suppose to be General Kommando chiefs:

"The Führer's headquarters, 18 December 1940. Secret. Only through officer. Nine copies. 4th copy. Directive Number 21, Case Barbarossa. "The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England. (Case Barbarossa.) "For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks. "For the Eastern campaign the Air Force will have to free such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main