26 Nov. 45

"As a landing of French and British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to upper Italy would be extremely difficult, and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will, to a great extent, paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces."
There again I think that must be a defective English translation. ' French lines of communication by the Italian fleet," must mean "fresh lines," or something in that connection.

"If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England, being at war with Italy, would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support, a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.

"The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made depending upon the course of the Italian-French-English war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military operations by these three States. The Führer was also not thinking of military agreements with Italy, but in complete independence and by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity, he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the speed of lightning." --The German words are "blitzartig schnell."

"Feldmarschall Von Blomberg and Generaloberst Von Fritsch, in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that we should not run the risk that England and France become our enemies:

"They stated that the war with Italy would not bind the French Army to such an extent that it would not be in a position to commence operations on our western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst Von Fritsch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has in mobilization and, quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications, which was pointed out particularly by