The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania
© 1978, The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation
 
 
Previous Page Back  Contents  Contents Page 32 Home Page Home Page  Forward Next Page 
     
But the author ends his treatise with a prognostic which leaves a doubt in the air as to the very principle of a Jewish reserve:
"In the meantime, the war imposes its own problems on us and the victory will confront the German people with new tasks, still greater, most of which will be more important than the problem of a Jewish reserve. The last word has not yet been pronounced, but it will be at the appropriate time and by an authoritative source in order to definitively liberate the people and the Reich from the malediction of Europe: the Jew on the eastern border."
One has the impression that the author wanted to lead public opinion to believe that the German people would have neither time nor energy to lose in taking care of the settlement of the Jews and that Hitler would know how to pronounce the word which would assure their disappearance in the most radical of manners. Isn't this how we must interpret the unutterable "final goal" that Heydrich announced on September 21, 1939? The following observation is in fact found in the report on the inspection trip that Seyss Inquart, deputy of Governor General Frank, made to the General Government in November 1940. It concerns the eventuality of a Jewish reserve in the region of Lublin:
"This region, with its swampy character, could quite possibly, according to the reflections of District Governor Schmidt, be used as a Jewish reserve, a measure which would probably greatly decimate the Jews." (64).
Relating to this it is to be noted that Heydrich, in his memorandum of September 21, 1939, to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen, insinuated that the mysterious final goal would be attrained [sic] by the living conditions that these measures would bring about for the Jews.

The plan for a Jewish reserve in the General Government was given up as of 1940 (LXXXVIII-67).

Between summer 1940, after the brilliant victory in the West, and autumn 1941, the ideas concerning "the final solution" to be given to the Jewish question were not fixed. It was hoped that the power represented by the victorious Reich would oblige the other nations to grant the Reich space for a Jewish reserve. The plan for a Jewish reserve in Madagascar included Jews from Poland as well as from Western Europe. That did not prevent the continued concentration of Jews in the General Government until March 1941. Eichmann was able to tell of an order from Hitler to evacuate 300,000 of them, a figure which was far from being attained at the time. (65) As the deportations of Jews concerned mainly the Austrian territories and the Protectorate, Eichmann with his two Zentralstellen in these two countries was greatly involved in this operation. In addition to the Jews, Poles were massively deported from Poland annexed to the General Government. All of this movement of populations provoked the furor of the Governor General, H. Frank. To counter these reproaches against the chaotic action of the Sipo-SD, Heydrich created within the Gestapo (the RSHA IV) a section IV D4 to organize this action. He named Eichmann its chief. Dannecker was
    
   

 
The Holocaust and the Neo-Nazi Mythomania
© 1978, The Beate Klarsfeld Foundation
Previous Page  Back Page 32 Forward  Next Page